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The greatest nuclear danger that people are concerned with is not the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons to other states, though that is a grave danger. Of even greater concern is the invidious belief 
of policy makers in a small number of states that they have a right to maintain nuclear weapons 
indefinitely, and that in their hands nuclear weapons do not constitute a threat either to their own 
citizens or to the remainder of humanity. At the fact of such concern the most alarm question is can the 
twenty-first century be nuclear free? That is the dream of many people concerned with weapons of 
mass destruction. Some steps in that direction were taken, but much more needs to be done, and the 
danger of nuclear materials falling into the wrong hands remains acute. 
Why do people pay attention to this topic and exactly to North Korea? The answer is obvious. 
The DPRK is an exciting object for discussion on the modern political stage. First of all, communist 
regime of this state, which makes some democratic states, such as the United States and its allies in the 
Northeast Asia – Japan and South Korea “feel uncomfortable”, causes some international problems. 
Due to the fact that North Korea is a closed state, it has very limited ties with some countries, world 
community can hardly trace its policy and impose sanctions. Secondly, the DPRK breaks laws and 
international agreements, concerning non-proliferation. In 2003 North Korea withdrew from the 
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NTP), so no one knows what to expect from this state in the future. 
The third reason we must pay attention to is the growing nuclear power of North Korea and its 
ambitious tendencies in this field stands a global problem of nuclear proliferation. 
To understand why North Korea started the development of nuclear weapon and what exactly 
influenced it, we have to overview backgrounds of its development, to look through the history of this 
phenomenon.  
Korea has been a divided country since 1945, when it was liberated from the defeated Japan 
after World War II. The Korean War was fought from June 25, 1950, until a ceasefire was signed on 
July 27, 1953. However, since North Korea and South Korea have still not officially made peace, 
strictly speaking, the war has not officially ended yet.  
This way, tensions between North and South have run higher and higher on numerous occasions 
since 1953. The deployment of the U.S. Army's Second Infantry Division on the Korean peninsula and 
the American military presence in the Korean Demilitarized Zone are publicly regarded by North 
Korea as an occupying army. These circumstances allowed the US forces to be headquartered there to 
maintain peace in the region, however, their presence is fueling the tensions. The tension led to the 
border clash in 1976, which has become known as the Axe Murder Incident [1]. 
According to newly declassified documents from the archives of former communist allies of 
North Korea, Pyongyang first began to pursue nuclear technology as early as 1956. One of the reasons 
why the DPRK hastened efforts to acquire the technology to produce nuclear weapons was the early 
1960s security concerns in the region and an apparent Soviet dismissal [2]. In particular the two most 
important factors in North Korea's attempts to become militarily self-reliant were the Cuban Missile 
Crisis of October 1962 and the prospect of a US–Japan–ROK alliance following the 1965 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the ROK and Japan. Kim Il Sung reportedly did not 
trust that the Soviets would live up to the conditions of the mutual defense pact and guarantee North 
Korea's security since they betrayed Castro by withdrawing nuclear missiles in an effort to improve 
relations with the United States [2]. As a North Korean official explained to Soviet Premier Alexei 
Kosygin in 1965, "the Korean leaders were distrustful of the CPSU ( Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union) and the Soviet government, they could not count on that the Soviet government would keep the 
obligations related to the defense of Korea it assumed in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance, Kim Il said, and therefore they were compelled to keep an army of 700,000 and a 
police force of 200,000" [2]. Explaining the cause of such mistrust, the official claimed that "the 
Soviet Union had betrayed Cuba at the time of the Caribbean crisis" [3]. However, as recently 
declassified Russian, Hungarian, and East German materials confirm, no communist governments 
were willing to share the technology with the North Koreans, out of fear that they would share the 
technology with China [4].
  
After collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea was in need of another nuclear power since 
Pyongyang could not afford to maintain its military posture. Therefore, the DPRK tried to build 
relationships with the United States. But the U.S. rejected this proposal and stated that only six-party 
talks that also include the People's Republic of China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea are acceptable. 
Six-party talks were not held as North Korea refused to take part in them. Finally, North Korean 
government had to conduct development themselves. And on October 9, 2006, the North Korean 
government issued an announcement that it had successfully conducted a nuclear test for the first time. 
Both the United States Geological Survey and Japanese seismological authorities detected an 
earthquake with a preliminary estimated magnitude of 4.2 in North Korea, corroborating some aspects 
of the North Korean claims [5].
 
Later on May 25, 2009 North Korea conducted a second test of a 
nuclear weapon. 
This way, the start of the North Korean developments of nuclear weapon was caused by the 
complicated political situation in the region. Spoiled international relationships with the U.S., Japan 
and division of the country into two different – all had its profound impact. Besides, the support 
received from the Soviet Union became the background of invention. 
What are the reasons to be threatened? As we found earlier North Korean leaders see the 
country`s security in possession of a nuclear weapon and missile program. But does this defense 
program threaten the security of other countries? We can say for sure – no! 
The North Korean threat comes in two forms: vertical - development of its nuclear capability 
and horizontal - spread of nuclear know-how and technology to others. Pyongyang tested two nuclear 
devices and is believed to be working on a third. Experts say Pyongyang has enough fissile material 
for 5-12 nuclear weapons [7]. The regime is also scrambling to develop its ballistic missile program. 
What`s more, the regime appears to be developing its ties with other actors bent on acquiring a 
nuclear capability, including those in the Middle East (Pakistan, Iran, Israel).   
When considering the dangers of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, politicians find 
that the first and the main reason is proliferation of nuclear weapon. If the DPRK develops nuclear 
weapons, its neighbors will inevitably do so, too. Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, for example, said, 
"The governments of the world must understand what a threat it is if the DPRK gets nuclear weapons, 
because there are probably 10 other countries in the East over the next 10 to 20 years that would 
follow down that road" [6].  
Indeed, since the dawn of the nuclear age, many states have feared rapid and widespread nuclear 
proliferation. 65 years later, only nine countries have developed nuclear weapons. Nearly 20 years 
elapsed between the emergence of the first nuclear state, the United States, in 1945, and the fifth, 
China, in 1964. The next 40 years gave birth to four additional nuclear countries: India, Israel, South 
Africa, and Pakistan [8]. Similarly, it has now been a long time since North Korea became a nuclear 
weapon state. The fruit of such a rapid and widespread nuclear proliferation is unknown to anyone.  
The second reason to be threatened is that North Korea's arsenal will surely grow, as will the 
amount of its fissile material. The results of this growth will be destabilizing and potentially 
disastrous: a sizable North Korean nuclear arsenal might well stimulate similar weapons programs, for 
example, in both Japan and South Korea, diminishing the region's stability. Worse, Japan might decide 
to undertake a nuclear weapon program of its own, which would surely provoke a Chinese response, 
which in turn could cause reverberations in India and Pakistan. There could also be repercussions in 
Taiwan and South Korea, both of which had fledgling nuclear weapon programs of their own before 
U.S. pressure forced their termination [9]. The repercussions could also spread far beyond Northeast 
Asia if Pyongyang decides to sell its new weapons or nuclear fuel for hard currency – as it was with 
drugs and missile technology in the past. 
It is necessary to emphasize that, perhaps, there is a larger danger: North Korea could sell its 
plutonium, highly enriched uranium, or finished weapons to other countries or terrorists. Its track 
record with ballistic missiles is not encouraging. It has made missile deals with Iran, Yemen, Syria, 
and Pakistan—lucrative sources of income to the impoverished country [10]. Fissile material and 
nuclear weapons would be even more lucrative. 
The third reason is the risks of nuclear terrorism. Terrorism has become an accepted and 
integrated part of the national security policies of the nuclear weapons states. Terrorism is the threat to 
injure or kill innocent people unless the terrorist's demands are met. Nuclear weapons threaten to 
injure or kill innocent people. That is what they are designed to do. That is what may happen if North 
Korea does not stop proliferation. That is what the DPRK threatens to do as a matter of policy. The 
nuclear weapons states, no matter how they argue their intentions, have become terrorist states. They 
have made their citizens either willing or unwilling accomplices in acts of terrorism. In time, if 
nothing is done to alter the present situation in the world, other states or criminal groups will obtain 
nuclear weapons and they will also act as terrorists. 
Furthermore, the DPRK is a closed society and the covert nature of its nuclear program makes it 
a “difficult intelligence collection target,” as the international community puts it [11]. No one knows 
what North Korea’s nuclear intentions are — Pyongyang relies heavily on ambiguity in all it does. Has 
Kim Jong Il decided that North Korea’s security requires a stockpile of nuclear weapons? Pyongyang 
is simply ready to play hardball. The world community`s hope that North Korea will give up its 
nuclear program seems fanciful at this point. What incentives could possibly be offered that would 
cause it to give up its weapons program, dismantle its nuclear complex, and agree to an intrusive 
verification regime? It is highly unlikely that North Korea will agree to abandon the very thing that 
gives it leverage with its neighbors. 
 To sum up it is necessary to mark out, that nowadays some countries maintain nuclear weapons 
indefinitely. There is indeed urgency in the assertion that danger of the threat from nuclear weapons 
will remain for as long as there are nuclear weapons. There is also a belief that makes us think it over, 
if we really live in a safe world and what we can do to change the situation. 
The one thing I can probably say for sure about the prospects for universal nuclear disarmament 
is that no state will agree either to abjure or to dismantle nuclear weapons unless it believes that such a 
course is the best course for its own national security. So, we should persuade states like North Korea 
to follow international rules and agreements and this way start disarmament. By this article I want to 
attract attention of other people to this problem. As consider that preventing of nuclear proliferation 
we should start with ourselves. Everybody can take in the motto: The risk of a nuclear catastrophe is 
far greater than we think. Our ability to reduce that risk is far greater than we imagine. Let's start 
tapping into that ability! 
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